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For many years I have maintained that I learned to philosophize by translating Francisco Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputation V from Latin into English. This surely is a claim that must sound extraordinary to the members of this audience or even to most twentieth century philosophers. Who reads Suárez these days? And what could I learn from a sixteenth century scholastic writer that would help me in the twentieth century? I would certainly be surprised if one were to find any references to some of Suárez’s works in any of the works of twentieth-century major philosophers. 
	One of the reasons for my claim is the great difficulty I had in figuring out what Suárez’s text means and how to render it understandable to English readers. Translating the text forced me to think in ways that were quite different from those I was used to think in Spanish, my native tongue, or English, my adoptive tongue. In fact, the translation I produced after having completed many drafts continued, and still continues to this day, to appear to me unsatisfactory, and that dissatisfaction was the key to understanding things I had understood very differently before. I hope to make clear why in what follows.
	The thesis that I defend is that semantic equivalence between texts of philosophy in different languages is difficult, if not impossible in some cases, to achieve and, therefore, that it is a mistake to restrict doing analytic philosophy to English, as Gustavo Rodríguez-Pereyra argues we should do in a recent article (2013).
	Let me begin by noting an assumption that I unconsciously made at the beginning of my Suárez’s translation project and that informs every translation project to some extent. This assumption may be formulated as what I call the Principle of the Semantic Equivalence of Texts in Different Languages:
PSE: Any text in any language has actual or potential semantically equivalent texts in every other language. 
But what does it mean that two texts from two different languages are semantically equivalent? Consider an example of two scientific texts, one in English and one in Spanish:
	(1) ‘H2O boils at 100 degrees C’
	(2) ‘H2O hierve a 100 grados C’ 
What does it mean to say that (1) is semantically equivalent to (2)? Here are two ways of understanding it:
	(A) (1) and (2) express the same proposition (metaphysical criterion)
(B) (1) causes the same understanding in an English speaking audience that (2) causes in a Spanish speaking audience (epistemic criterion)
(A) and (B) are not equivalent, but for present purposes either one of them will do, for in both cases the translations of (1) by (2), or vice versa, appear to satisfy PSE. Indeed, PSE appears to apply well to cases of scientific texts, such as the one mentioned, as well as to cases of ordinary language, such as the English sentence ‘The cat is black’ which has as equivalent the Spanish sentence ‘El gato es negro.’ But PSE does not seem to apply as well to literary texts. Consider the following six translations of Emily Dickinson’s famous verse “Hope is the thing with feathers.” The list below is headed by the original English text from Dickinson, followed by six translations into Spanish, each of which is in turn followed by its English translation:
		“Hope is the thing with feathers.” 
	1. La esperanza es la cosa con plumas.
	    	Hope is the thing with feathers.
	2. La esperanza es la cosa que tiene plumas.
	    	Hope is the thing that has feathers.
	3. La esperanza es la cosa emplumada.
		Hope is the feathered thing.
	4. La esperanza es una cosa de plumas.
	    	Hope is a thing of feathers.
	5. La esperanza es algo de plumas.
		Hope is something of feathers.
	6. La esperanza es esa cosa con plumas. 
		Hope is that thing with feathers.
None of the Spanish translations appears adequate. Indeed, even the literal translation in (1) fails insofar Dickinson’s verse is elegant, suggestive, and light, whereas the Spanish translation appears crude, limited, and heavy, which is particularly clear when the verse and its translations are read aloud (for my theory of why this is so in all cases of literary texts in general, see Gracia 2012, 155-84).
	Now why is this important and how is it related to Rodríguez-Pereyra’s thesis that “research in analytical philosophy broadly conceived should be published exclusively in English” (2013, 83)? It is important and related to this thesis because, prima facie, one might be tempted to think that Rodríguez-Pereyra’s thesis implies that he is committed to PSE and, consequently, that the thesis is false insofar as it does not hold with respect to literary texts, as Dickinson’s example makes clear. However, although Rodríguez-Pereyra’s thesis requires some form of PSE, it would be a mistake to think the formulation needed would have to be as strong as the one given above. Rodríguez-Pereyra’s position requires only a weaker form of the PSE applicable exclusively to analytic philosophy, such as:
PSE’: Any text resulting from analytic philosophy in any language has actual or potential semantically equivalent texts resulting from analytic philosophy in every other language. 
Without this principle, Rodríguez-Pereyra could not effectively argue that analytic philosophy should be done only in English, unless he were to hold that English has analytic philosophical advantages that other languages lack – a view he does not appear to hold. The reason is that the meaning of some pertinent English and Spanish texts, for example, might not be semantically equivalent, and therefore there might be things that could be said in texts of analytic philosophy in one of the languages that could not be said in the other. Rodríguez-Pereyra is concerned only with texts in analytic philosophy. For example, Wittgenstein’s claim, in Ogden’s English translation, ‘The world is the totality of facts, not things,’ which presumably is semantically equivalent to the original German version as well as the Spanish ‘El mundo es la totalidad de los hechos, no de las cosas’ insofar as both presumably have the same meaning, namely, a proposition to the effect that the world is the totality of facts.  
	PSE’, if true, makes possible Rodríguez-Pereyra’s claim that analytic philosophers (e.g., Latin American) are free to use English, rather than, say, Spanish, in their philosophizing, since there would not be semantic idiosyncratic consequences of their use of English or Spanish. Obviously, then, if there are practical benefits of using English in analytic philosophy rather than Spanish as he argues, Spanish-speaking analytic philosophers should use English rather than Spanish when they philosophize (85).
	Still, Rodríguez-Pereyra’s thesis, even considered in terms of the PSE’, is not free from difficulties (see Hurtado 2013, Pérez 2013, Ruffino 2013, and the other articles in this publication). Here I would like to articulate two. One is that some practical conditions for the success of the project cannot be satisfied in our present world. The other is that the project requires a clear-cut dichotomy between analytic philosophical language on the one hand and ordinary and literary language on the other and there is no such clear-cut dichotomy.
	In order to substantiate the first difficulty, let me refer to a period of philosophy in which a similar situation to that envisioned by Rodríguez-Pereyra’s proposal with respect to analytic philosophy was a reality with respect to all philosophy. This is the Latin Middle Ages, a time that loosely speaking goes from around the sixth to the fifteenth centuries.  
	The medieval system worked well because those who practiced philosophy at the time, and scholastics in particular, formed a community that shared several common conditions among which are the following: (1) an established curriculum, (2) a set of methodological assumptions, (3) a language in which philosophers were educated and which they wrote and spoke with ease, (4) a set of writing genres, and (5) a philosophical tradition based on the models that Boethius had passed on to the Middle Ages and were later augmented by the translations of works from Aristotle and other ancient philosophers as well as some Islamic and Jewish philosophers. This made possible for masters and students separated by centuries and originating in lands as distant as England and Italy, to communicate effectively and for philosophy to benefit from the input of peoples from everywhere, which are the two main practical benefits intended by Rodríguez-Pereyra’s proposal (2013, 85).
	If we assume that the medieval system worked because of the mentioned conditions, then it becomes difficult to argue for its effective implementation, mutatis mutandis, to the case of analytic philosophy today. The reason is that analytic philosophy a present, even if it satisfies some of these conditions, does not satisfy most of them. Indeed, if we take seriously Max Black’s characterization of analytic philosophy as a group of “philosophers who share a common intellectual heritage and are committed to the clarification of basic philosophical concepts” (1963, v), the point is quite clear. Charitably we might grant that some analytic philosophers share a belief that they are doing something similar, a set of methodological assumptions, the article genre, and perhaps a set of texts regarded as originative of their philosophical tradition. Even then, the other conditions operative in the Middle Ages are not satisfied. Analytic philosophers outside the Anglosaxon world have not been educated in English, and they do not share a rigorous training in a common set of disciplines, a technical vocabulary, or assumptions about religion and life. Both Rodríguez-Pereyra and at least one of his critics seem to accept the view that English competence is widespread among Spanish speaking analytic philosophers, but my own  experience, which extends to most countries of Latin America and to Spain for a period of at least forty years, does not support this belief. 
	The difficulty with Rodríguez-Pereyra’s proposal is not only a matter of some conditions missing in the community of analytic philosophers today, but also of the fact that language is a cultural product resulting from unique historical circumstances and events that mold populations and reflect different values and world views. This is the second, and more important, difficulty I see with Rodríguez-Pereyra’s proposal, for I believe his thesis does not take it into this account. It is not just that, say, Spanish and English sound different, that their grammars are different, and that their vocabularies and what the words mean do not coincide. The difficulty arises because languages are ways of living, and understanding a language requires an understanding of the way of life that produced it, that is, it requires living it (cf., Hurtado 2013, 109). Languages reflect conceptual frameworks that carve out experiences differently. Indeed, entire philosophical systems have been developed based on idiosyncracies of certain languages. Is not the distinction between substance and property that permeates western philosophy a byproduct of the languages in which western philosophy first developed? Rodríguez-Pereyra is too quick to dismiss the close connection of languages to world views. Indeed, how else can we explain the difficulty in translating the Spanish distinction between the verbs  ser and estar into English, or the obstacles posed by the attempt to translate Aristotle’s Metaphysics from Greek, a language rich in ontological vocabulary, into Chinese, a language that lacks equivalent terms?
	The key point that follows from the understanding of language as I have suggested is that most texts in one language cannot be effectively translated into texts from other languages. Note that I am not saying that their translation is impossible. I do not subscribe to Benjamin Lee Whorf’s notorious Principle of Linguistic Relativity. Philosophy claims to be universal. It tries, like science, to make claims that have universal validity, and this entails that, regardless of the peculiarities of particular languages and cultures, it should be possible to translate texts from one language into another. But this does not contradict the less controversial claim that each language favors particular ways of conceiving the world and, therefore, that it is difficult and sometimes even impossible effectively to translate every text in one language into a text of another. Nowhere is this more clear than in the translation of texts that are literary, but it is also quite evident in texts in ordinary language. 
	To this, Rodríguez-Pereyra could object that the language of philosophy that concerns him is neither literary nor ordinary; philosophy uses technical language, as the very jargons of scholastics and analytic philosophers show. Unfortunately this is not right. Some philosophy is quite technical, but most philosophy is not, analytic philosophy included. After all, one of the great currents of analytic philosophy advocated the use of ordinary language, and to this day one of the virtues of analytic philosophy in the twentieth and twenty first centuries is the effective use of ordinary language as Rodríguez-Pereyra’s own article illustrates. The great project of the logical positivists of developing an ideal language has never quite gotten off the ground. And even the most strict logical positivists used ordinary language when they philosophized. Indeed, analytic philosophers continue to use ordinary language today, as any page of any philosophy article confirms, and the reason is that philosophy is ultimately based on ordinary experience and common sense, and through them in the ordinary language in which they are expressed. This is a fact of which the founders of analytic philosophy were well aware, or have we already forgotten the lessons that G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein taught us? Rodríguez-Pereyra’s position requires a very narrow understanding of philosophy and its task, a point that all three of his critics mentioned earlier bring up (Pérez 2013, 94; Hurtado 2013, 107-108; and Ruffino 2013, 100). In fact, Rodríguez-Pereyra seems to forget four rather important points: (1) analytic philosophy has given ordinary language a principal role from its beginning; (2) peculiarities of particular languages have given rise to important philosophical positions; (3) the close relationship between ordinary language and culture is significant; and (4) ordinary language is closely related to experience and experience is fundamental for philosophy. 
	If philosophy uses ordinary language and ordinary language reflects a way of life, then we should be able to advance our understanding by learning other languages, and the benefits of using only one language to do analytic philosophy imposes a counterproductive limitation. In short, it would be ultimately harmful to use only one language to do philosophy, be that philosophy analytic or not, for to do so would narrow the range of our experience and horizons.  Indeed, if we consider the period in which Latin was the language of philosophy, we can see that, although philosophy at the time reached enormous heights in certain areas, it did not advance in others. And one of the reasons why it did not was that it was stuck in Latin and the Latin language game. 
	Now it should be clear why I started this talk with a reference to my project of translating Suárez. A translator, as Boethius so well put it, is always a traitor, for a translation always fails to some extent, even when the translator translates a rather technical philosophical text. Ruffino, one of Rodríguez-Pereyra’s critics, is too generous when he states that “Knowledge of Greek and Latin is certainly not a sine qua non condition for reading for reading ancient Greek or medieval philosophy, since there are usually good translations available” (Ruffino 2013,103). It is true that one may be able “to read” the translated texts, and even get a more or less adequate understanding of the meaning of the texts in the original languages, but as to a precise and accurate understanding of the original author’s meaning, that is another matter altogether. My experience with translations is quite different to that of Ruffino, for there is not a single translation of a philosophical text from one language I know into another that I also know, that satisfies me (and that includes my own), or that is universally regarded by experts as a faithful rendition of the original. Indeed, it is precisely because of this that the process of translation opens windows to previously unknown vistas and the reason I was able to learn much by translating Suárez’s Disputation V into English. 
	Rodríguez-Pereyra’s thesis suggests that perhaps he does not sufficiently appreciate diversity, even when scientists tell us that diversity is the key to life, survival, and progress. Nature teaches quite clearly that a genetically diverse pool is the key to strength. Nature seeks diversity to facilitate survival. This suggests that variety in the language of philosophy should also be beneficial, as in fact the history of philosophy shows. There is no reason to think, then, that linguistic diversity is not beneficial to analytic philosophy. The Principle of Semantic Equivalence is not pertinent not because it is impossible to find such equivalence in languages, but because it is very difficult to do so in part because the language of philosophy, including analytic philosophy, is mixed with ordinary and literary language insofar as it is founded on ordinary experience.
	So, no, let us not restrict doing analytic philosophy to English less we fall into a “dogmatic slumber.” Linguistic diversity should help us broaden our horizons and thus help in the search for a deeper philosophical understanding.
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